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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through Utah State Department
of Social Services,

Case No. 18988

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.
JOHN DICK,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This Interlocutory Appeal concerns the conflicting overlapping
original jurisdictions of the juvenile and district courts where
a minor has been charged with violations of the Utah Uniform Act
on Paternity (Sections 78-45a-l et

U.C.A.

(1953)).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In district court, the State of Utah filed a civil action
against Appellant.

The State sought child support from the Appellant

pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity.

Appellant specially

appeared to contest the district court's jurisdiction and to seek
removal of the action to the juvenile court.

Appellant's "Motion

for an Order Releasing Jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court" was
denied in an Order dated January 24, 1983 and signed by Judge
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court.
-1-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the district court's Order on the
grounds that the letter and spirit of the Utah Juvenile Court
Act (Sections 78-3a-l et

U.C.A.

(1953)) require that the

juvenile court exercise exclusive, original jurisdiction where a
minor is accused of violations of the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Absence of Record.

There is virtually no record

in this Interlocutory Appeal

other than the Complaint, Appellant's Motion for removal, and the
district court's Order denying that Motion.

No stenographic record

was taken at the hearing on Appellant's Motion.
B.

Minimal Facts.

On August 9, 1982, sixteen-year-old Renee Gentilin gave birth
to an illegitimate son, Jeremy.

Three months later, the State of

Utah, through its department of social services, filed the Complaint
herein.

The Complaint alleges that the Appellant, John L. Dick,

has violated the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity in the matter of
Renee and Jeremy Gentilin.

The Complaint charges the Appellant with

the expenses of Renee's pregnancy and birth and with the ongoing
support of her son, Jeremy.
Appellant has not yet answered the Complaint.

However, he will

admit to having had sexual relations with Renee approximately nine
months before the birth of Jeremy.
-2-

At that specific time--in the

autumn of 1981--the Appellant was barely fifteen years old.
C.

Undocumented Assertions of Fact.

Appellant wishes to present to the Court certain undocumented
assertions of fact relating to his personhood.

Fully and openly

labeled as such, they are as follows:
John Dick's father and mother were married in 1962.

It was

his father's first marriage and his mother's second marriage.

The

latter already had two sons by a previous husband.
John was born in August, 1966.

Subsequently, a younger sister

was born.
His parents' marriage was stormy.
quarrels.

It was marked by tension and

John's mother allegedly was psychologically unstable.

Allegedly she tried to commit suicide while John was an infant.
During John's lifetime, his parents separated three times:
in 1974 and again in 1975.

in 1967,

Although he was still quite young, John's

school work and personality were affected:

he constantly quarreled

with his classmates.
In September, 1976, when John had just turned ten, his parents
divorced.

John's mother was awarded custody of the children.

moved with them to Farmington, Utah.

She

A little over a year later,

she remarried a divorced gentleman.
John's stepfather was a cruel disciplinarian.

He repeatedly

beat John (and John's older half-brother) with instruments such as
saws and belts.

John was affected.

At school he had problems

learniny the basics; several tutors were required.
-3-

Twice he ran

away from home.
Because of the repeated physical abuse of John by his stepfathn
John's biological father obtained a Modification of the Decree of
Divorce in September, 1979.

At John's own request, custody was

transferred to his father.
In the interim, John's father had remarried and had had two
daughters.

Barely thirteen years old, John moved into his father's

household in West Jordan.

[It may be noted that, in all, John has

one "whole-sibling," five half-siblings and ten step-siblings.]
The move to West Jordan was traumatic.

Although John got along

well with his stepmother, he did not get along with his half-sisters.
Moreover, within a short period, relations with his father grew
strained.

At school, the level of John's work, which was already

poor, eroded further.

A tutor was engaged.

The boy received

psychiatric therapy.
In April, 1981, when he was fourteen, John ran away from home.
After four days, John's father discovered his son's whereabouts and
prevailed upon him to return.

It is alleged that John had first had

sexual relations with Renee Gentilin during this interval.
That summer, John lived in a children's camp, where he helped
with the horses and did odd jobs.

Upon returning home in July, he

immediately began attending rodeos across the state:

he was away

from home every weekend.
In August, when he turned fifteen, John again ran away from
home.

It was discovered that he was living with a friend, Scott.
-4-

John's father acquiesced and allowed the boy to remain there.

For

11varly two months, John lived with his friend and with his friend's
three Drothers and sisters and his friend's mother.

John's parents

contributed to his support.
Ultimately, however, the friend's influence was bad.

Assertedly,

petty crimes were being committed, and the boys' life-style was
unruly.

John's school work deteriorated further.

In October, 1981, John returned home.
a single encounter with Renee Gentilin.
extensive counseling.
courses.

In early November he had
At high school he received

He would, nevertheless, fail a number of

On August 9, 1982, two days before John's sixteenth

birthday, Renee gave birth to a child.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

The Utah Juvenile Court Act
Unequivocably Mandates That
The Juvenile Court Exercise
Exclusive Original Jurisdiction in the Instant Action.

Section 78-3a-16(1) of the Act is clear and unequivocal.

Section 78-3a-16(1) U.C.A.

(1953), reads as follows:

"Except

as otherwise provided by law, the [juvenile] court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:

(1) Concerning any child

who has violated any federal, state or local law or municipal
')rd1nance

[The exception created by the first six words

will be discussed below in Point II.]
The

language is straightforward and unambiguous.
-5-

It

obviously means this:

Whenever a child has violated any state

law, exclusive original jurisdiction vests in the juvenile court.
B.

Where statutory language is clear, that statute must be

interpreted to mean precisely what it says.
"[T]here is nothing to construe where there is no ambiguity in
the statute."

State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974).

[A statute] carries with it the presumptions
that it is valid, and that the words and phrases
were chosen advisedly to express the legislative
intent.
. The statute should not be applied
other than in accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or confused as to
be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, or it
contravenes some basic constitutional right.
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451, 20
Utah 2d 138 (1967).
See, also, Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036,
26 Utah 2d 100 (1971).
C.

A gloss that would limit the juvenile court's jurisdiction

to only "criminal" laws should not be read into the statute.
(1) It is against policy.

This Court has addressed the matter:

It is often said that it should be assumed
that all of the words used in a statute were
used advisedly and were intended to be given
meaning and effect.
For the same reason,
the omissions should likewise be taken note
of and given effect.
Kennecott
v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 219, 32;Utah 2d
102 (1973).
[Footnotes omitted]
1.

The second sentence in the Kennecott decision, above, is
drawn from a 1929 California case which merits direct citation:
"We [the California court] may not, therefore, under
the guise of interpretation read into a statute matters
which have been omitted by the Legislature particularly

-6-

(2)

Other states have statutes similar to Utah's.

Not only

is it improper, pursuant to this Court's policy, to introduce a
restrictive gloss into Paragraph 78-3a-16(1) of the Juvenile Court
Act.

Additionally, it would be senseless to do so, because other

states operate under statutes worded very similarly to Utah's.
For example:
In Hawaii the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over
children who have committed "a violation or attempted violation of
any federal, state or local law or municipal ordinance."
571-11,

Section

(F), Hawaii Code Annotated.

In Illinois the juvenile court has jurisdiction over children
under seventeen who have "violated or attempted to violate any
federal or state law or municipal ordinance."

Section 37-702-2,

Illinois Code Annotated.
In Louisiana the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child
or ordinance .

"who violates any law

Section 13:570, Revised Statutes of Louisiana.

In Michigan the juvenile division of the probate court has
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under
seventeen years of age "who has violated any municipal ordinance or
law of the state or of the United States

Section 27.3178

(598.2(1)), Michigan Code Annotated.
where it appears that the omission might have been intentional .
In re Barnett's Estate, 275 P. 453, 455-56
(Cal. App. 1929).
-7-

In Minnesota the juvenile court has exclusive, oriyinal jurisdiction, with certain exceptions, in proceedinys where a
child "has violated any state or local law."

[delinquent]

Section 260.015,

Minnesota Code Annotated.
In Pennsylvania the juvenile court has full and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings affecting a [delinquent] child who "has
violated any law of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any city,
borough or township

Section 11-243 (4) (a), Pennsylvania

Code Annotated.
In South Carolina the family court system has exclusive, original jurisdiction, with certain exceptions, in proceedings concerning
any child "who is alleged to have violated

. any state or local

Section 20-7-400 A. (1) (d) . 11

law or municipal ordinance .

Thus, the Juvenile Court Act should be read and applied
exactly as it is written.

Section 78-3a-16(1) requires that the

juvenile court exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where a
minor--such as Appellant herein--has violated any state law, in-

1.

Certain other states had statutes that read similarly to
Utah's but have recently amended those statutes to restrict
the juvenile court's jurisdiction to violations of soecifically criminal laws.
See, for example, Florida Code Annotated,
939.01(8) amended to §39.01(33); Iowa Code Annotated,
13232.2(13) (a) amended to 232.2(11); Mississippi Cod2 Annotated,
§43-21-5 amended to §43-21-105. Such modifications support
Appellant's argument that unmodified codes, such as Utah's,
are intended to mean precisely what they say:
i.e., that
jurisdiction extends to violations of civil as well as of
criminal laws.
-8-

a noncriminal law like the Uniform Act on Paternity.
Unfortunately, however, section 78-3a-16 of the Juvenile Court
Act is complicated by the inclusion of a limiting phrase:
as otherwise provided by law .

"Except

It is to the meaning and

application of this phrase that we now turn.
POINT II.

A.

Where the Juvenile Court Act
and the Uniform Act on Paternity Establish Overlapping
Jurisdictions, the Mandate
of the Juvenile Court Act
Must Prevail.

The Uniform Act on Paternity and the Juvenile Court Act

set jurisdiction in conflicting courts.
The case at bar was brought against plaintiff pursuant to the
Uniform Act on Paternity, Sections 48-45a-l et seq., U.C.A.
Section 48-45a-5(1) begins as follows:

(1953).

"The district court has

jurisdiction of an action under this act . .
On the other hand, the Appellant was, variously, fifteen and
sixteen years of age when he allegedly violated the above state
law.

Pursuant to Section 78-3a-16(1) of the Juvenile Court Act,

the juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction where a
child has violated any state law.
Thus, it must be decided which of two conflicting statutes

B.

Precedents concerning traffic violations by minors support
contention that the juvenile court, and not the district
-9-

court, should exercise jurisdiction in the instant mattvr.

CU

Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt Lake City.

A somewhat analo-

gous pair of cases reached the Utah Supreme Court in 1968 and 1971.
In Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt Lake City, 444 P.2d 461, 462,
21 Utah 2d 257

(1968), a juvenile defendant protested the juris-

diction of the city court following a traffic violation.

The Utah

Supreme Court focused on the introductory, limiting phrase of
Section 78-3a-16 of the Juvenile Court Act, which phrase gives
the juvenile court original exclusive jurisdiction "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law."

The Court phrased the issue thus:

"The pertinent inquiry is whether it is in fact 'otherwise provided
by law' that the juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction of traffic violations."
The decision in Dimmitt was split:

two justices signed the

plurality opinion; one concurred in the result; one dissented; and
one neither concurred nor dissented, suggesting that the case "stands
for nothing."

(p. 464)

Three justices held that the city court

did have jurisdiction to try juveniles charged with traffic offenses
under city ordinances despite the fact that both courts, under
statute, had been given exclusive original jurisdiction.

Signifi-

cantly, the plurality opinion reasoned from the fact that the
Juvenile Court Act itself listed specific exceptions for traffic
violations (§78-3a-44 (4)) and for felonies
1.

(§78-3a-25) .

11

Addi-

Today's section numbers are used.
At the time of Qimmitt the
act was otherwise designated in the code.
-10-

tionally, the Court put forward common-sense reasons why the legislature, in passing the Juvenile Court Act, might have intended
traffic violations to be treated differently and to be handled in
uther courts.

For example, such violations were in the nature of

errors in violating traffic rules; minors had to be at least sixteen
and one-half years of age before driving; and in doing so they
were exercising the privileges of adults.

(p. 462.)

The case at bar, on the other hand, is distinguishable from
Dimmitt.

The case at bar concerns, not a traffic-rule violation,

bul a violation of the Uniform Act on Paternity.

Although the

Juvenile Court Act makes a specific exception of traffic violations,
nowhere does it assert that paternity or support matters may constitute an exception to its exclusive original jurisdiction over minors.
Moreover, whereas the juvenile courts are statutorily given
exclusive, original jurisdiction, the Uniform Act on Paternity
(unlike the City Court Act in Dimmitt) does not give the district
courts specifically exclusive or specifically original jurisdiction.
To the degree that Dimmitt is relevant, that earlier case should
guide this Court to hold that it is not "otherwise provided by law"
that the juvenile court shall not have exclusive original jurisdiction

in paternity actions.
(2)

Nelson v. Green.

Utah 2d 219

Nelson v. Green, 479 P.2d 480, 482, 25

(1971), concerned another traffic violation by a minor.

1'he Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dimmitt holding,

-11-

again in a

split decision.

Justice Henriod, dissenting and concurring in

part, stated:
This case is about as confusing as Dimmitt
v. City Court of Salt Lake City.
It is high
time that the legislature coordinate the
functions of the courts as they apply to
juveniles, and eliminate the overlapping
inconsistencies between the juvenile court
nad general legislation .
The Nelson decision reinforces Appellant's position that,
whereas traffic violations may be adjudicated elsewhere than in the
juvenile court, paternity actions involving a minor must be adjudicated only in the juvenile court.
Dimmitt was this:

The implied test in Nelson and

Did the Juvenile Court Act itself provide for

concurrent or alternate jurisdiction in some other court? If yes,
then another court might hear the case.

Applying that test to the

case at bar, one concludes that, because the Juvenile Court Act
does not provide for paternity actions' being adjudicated in some
other court, paternity actions must be tried exclusively and originally in the juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-16.
C.

Practice indicates that certain statutory jurisdictional

assignments must be disregarded where they conflict with the
Juvenile Court Act.
Implicit in the Dimmitt case, above, and obvious from practice
in this state is the following rule:

Where a statute may assign

jurisdiction to one court or another but fails to refer specifically
to minors, that statute should not be followed when it conflicts

-12-

with the jurisdictional mandate of the Juvenile Court Act.
The Juvenile Court Act was passed in 1965.

At that time, and

for many years thereafter, the Justices' Courts and the City Courts
were, by statute, given jurisdiction over class B and class C
misdemeanors (§1bB-4-16 and 78-5-4, U.C.A.

(1953)'.

Nevertheless,

such violations by minors were and have been commonly handled in
the juvenile courts.

Indeed, pursuant to Section 78-3a-18 of the

Juvenile Court Act, such violations are specifically required to
be transferred to the juvenile court where they have been started
in any other court.
In 1977, when the state's judiciary was reorganized and the
city courts were transformed into circuit courts, the latter's
jurisdiction in criminal matters was specifically limited to
persons eighteen years of age and older (§78-4-5(1) U.C.A.

(1953)).

In other words, the legislature formalized in writing what had
been normal practice for already a dozen years.
Thus, it can be seen that the mere statutory assignment of
jurisdiction to a district or circuit court (or to city or justices'
courts) has not, historically, been followed where such assignments
have conflicted with the Juvenile Court Act.

Such broad jurisdic-

tional assignments to the district or to lower courts have been
interpreted--in practice--to mean nothing more than an intended
division of authority between the senior and junior courts of this
state.
-13-

D.

Utah courts are required by law to construe a statute to

·effect the purpose of that statute.
"(U]nder the provisions of Section 68-3-2, U.C.A., 1953, we are
required to construe liberally all statutes with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice."
368 P.2d 261, 262, 13 Utah 2d 32

(1962).

State v. Hunt,

Application of Section

68-3-2 (and of its predecessor forms) is mandatory.
Wall, 171 P. 148, 151, 51 Utah 464 (1918) .)

(Hammond. v.

"The fundamental

consideration which transcends all others in regard to the interpretation and application of a statute is:
the legislature?"

What was the intent of

Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 411 P.2d 831,

832, 17 Utah 2d 337 (1966).
(A] statute should be considered in the
light of its background and purpose; and
also in connection with other aspects of
the law which have a bearing on the problem in order that its intent and purpose
be fulfilled.
Dimmitt v. City Court of
Salt Lake City, 444 7.2d 461, 464, 21
1
Utah 2d 257 (1968).
Hence, the arbiter of the instant conflict must address the
purposes or intents of the two conflicting statutes under review.
E.

The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is rehabilitative

rather than punitive.
Section 78-3a-l, U.C.A.
Juvenile Court Act.
1.

(1953), sets forth the purposes of the

Those purposes include the following:

Footnote omitted. This citation is drawn from Justice Callister's
dissent wherein he asserts that the juvenile court should have
exercised original jurisdiction in the matter of a traffic
violation by a minor.
-14-

To secure for each child coming before
the juvenile court such care, guidance,
and control, preferably in his own home,
as will serve his welfare and the best
interests of the state .
To this
end this act shall be liberally construed.
The Utah Supreme Court has refined upon these purposes:
"Embodied in [the juvenile court system] is a policy of allowing a
person to enter adult life free of a record of youthful indiscretions."

State v. Mcclendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980).

"The

main objective [of juvenile proceedings] is to inquire into bad behavior and its causes and to seek remedies and adjustments in the
child, rather than merely to accuse, convice and punish him."
Lindh,

359 P.2d 1058, 1059, 11 Utah 2d 385 (1961).

In re

"The [juvenile]

court is sort of a substitute parent and the proceedings, as provided by our statutes, are not criminal in nature but are inquiries
into the interest of the juvenile."
1020, 1021, 21 Utah 2d 229

Velasquez v. Pratt, 443 P.2d

(1968).

Although the preceding citations bear upon criminal matters,
they show, nevertheless, that the overriding philosophy behind the
juvenile court system is to rehabilitate the child rather than to
mechanically impose upon the child whatever punishment, retribution,
ammcnds or "civil responsibilities" may be felt by society to
befit that child's errant behavior.
F.

The purpose of the Uniform Act on Paternity is to exact
from the parents of illegitimate offspring.

The purpose of the paternity act is, apparently, to oblige the
-15-

parents of illegitimate offspritFJ tu s111>pu1t these ofEsp1-ing on a
par with their support of legitimate offspring.

Although not

technically punitive in nature, and certainly not criminal, the
act is, nevertheless, fraught with references to liability, bonds,
judgments and enforcement.
unyielding.

Its overall posture is mechanistic and

Nowhere does it refer to the age, status or background

of the parents.

Because the underlying policy is society's deter-

mination that the parents--and not the state--shall support illegitimate offspring, the statute has, in practice, both administratively and judicially, been applied so as to impose the statutory liability solely on the basis of the parents' ability to pay.

G.

By properly construing both relevant statutes, this Court

should hold that the juvenile court must exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the Appellant.
The liberal construction of a statute to effect its purposes,
which construction is required by law (§68-3-2, §78-3a-l, U.C.A.
(1953)), must begin, logically, with a jurisdictional analysis.

A

party denied entry to a court is denied, ipso facto, that court's
remedies.

Without access, a court is but a phantom court.

In the case at bar, let us assume that the Appellant is found
to be the father.
Should the district court maintain its jurisdiction, then that
court would respond within the rigid provisions of the Uniform Act
on Paternity.

It would impose ongoing liability upon the Appellant
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for a period extending forward eighteen years fron the birth of
the child.
Stated otherwise, the district court would respond in a way
that wou:d automatically thwart the very purpose of the Juvenile
court Act, which is rehabilitative of youth.
On the other hand, should the juvenile court be allowed to
exercise its jurisdiction, then the juvenile court would bring
unique expertise and resources to the case.
(§78-3a-39, U.C.A.

As mandated by statute

(1953)), the juvenile court might devise and

apply a wide variety of dispositions, all in accordance with the
perceived best interests of both the Appellant and society.

Quite

possibly, the court might require Appellant to shoulder his "civil
responsibilities" and support the offspring.

But unlike the

district court, the juvenile court would not impose a procrustean,
pecuniary formula.

It would also consider the long adult life

ahead of the Appellant; it would weigh

the imposition of longterm

civil amends against their likely effect on Appellant's psyche
and future.
Stated otherwise, the juvenile court would not respond in a
way that would automatically thwart the intent of the Uniform Act
on Paternity.
Thus,

juLisdiction in the instant matter should be placed in

the juvenile court.
H. Implicit legislative policy militates in favor of extending the
-17-

juvenile court's jurisdiction to the Appellant.
Nowhere has the Utah legislature clearly announced an intent
that parenthood occurring in a child should be treated with the
same mechanical, monetary concerns that are applied to adult parents.
Nowhere has the Utah legislature clearly announced an intent
that the disorders of juvenile crime are to be resolved by specialists with the goal of rehabilitation; whereas the disorders of
juvenile sexuality are to be resolved precisely like those of adults.
Nowhere is there a clear basis to believe that the Utah legislature would intend the following disparate results.
fifteen-year-old boy rapes a fifteen-year-old girl.

A disturbed
That boy may

avoid criminal penalties and be rehabilitated by the juvenile
justice system (pursuant to Section 78-3a-25, U.C.A.

(1953)).

A

second, equally disturbed fifteen-year-old boy "makes love to" and
impregnates the same fifteen-year-old girl.

The second boy, abso-

lutely and without fail, must now bear the civil, non-punitive
responsibility of supporting the offspring during a period of
eighteen years following the birth, until that second boy has become
a thirty-four-year-old man.
On the contrary, the Utah legislature has made it its business
to distinguish juveniles from adults

in matters of sexuality.

Recently, that same legislature has prohibited juveniles--and
juveniles alone--from either receiving contraceptives or having an
abortion unless their parents are informed.

It is obvious that

the legislature intends that, in matters of sexuality, juveniles
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are to he treated differently--and therefore separately.
CONCLUSION
The Utah legislature intended that violations of the Uniform
Act on Paternity are to be tried, exclusively and originally, in
the juvenile court.

It is not "elsewhere provided by law" that

the juvenile court is not to resolve such matters; for to assert
that proposition would be to subvert the spirit and purposes of
the Juvenile Court Act.
DATED this 9th day of May,

J

175 South West Temple, Su
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410
Attorney for Appellant
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I certify that on the 9th day of May, 1983, I caused to be
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attorney for respondent, at 431 Sou
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